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Introduction
Cigarette smoking causes more than 100,000 lung cancer
deaths each year in the United States.' Combined with other
smoking-related diseases, such as emphysema, heart disease
and cancers other than of the lungs, smoking leads to over
400,000 deaths each year in the United States. 2 It is
estimated that five to six million people will die from smoking
in the' United States between the years 1990-2000. 3 In
attempting to draw a connection between smoking and
movies, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton noted that seventy-
seven percent of all films released in 1996 featured scenes
depicting smoking, and furthermore, every film nominated for
best picture at the Academy Awards contained similar
scenes.4 Clinton cites these statistics in order to give validity
to her premise that Hollywood is to blame for an increase in
teenage smoking. 5 Despite all the scientific data and studies
seemingly proving the harmful effects of smoking, the
numbers of those who smoke are constantly increasing. 6 But,
do these statistics grant the government, particularly the
federal government, the power to regulate the use of tobacco
products in movies? Recently, the government has made
significant in-roads into the tobacco industry's realm of
advertisements, most noticeably the proposed settlement on
June 20, 1997 between the tobacco industry and some forty
state attorneys general. 7 The proposed settlement, pending
Congressional approval, calls for a $368.5 billion payment by
the tobacco industry, as well as strict regulations on tobacco
advertising, bans on product placement in movies and
television, and bans on brand-name sponsorship of sporting
1. See Institute for Health Policy, Brandeis University, Substance Abuse:
The Nation's Number One Health Problem, KEY INDICATORS FOR POLICY 33 (1993).
2. See 51 AMERICAN FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1914 (1995).
3. See Smoking & Health, Physician Responsibility: A Statement of the Joint
Committee on Smoking and Health, 108 Chest 1118 (1995).
4. See Richard Klein, Lighting Up the Screen, S. F. CHRON., Aug. 31, 1997,
at D18.
5. See id.
6. See The Cigarette - It's Still Cool on Screen, NEWSDAY, Viewpoint, Aug. 6,
1997, at A37.
7. See Douglas J. Wood, Will Bans on Tobacco Ads Pass Muster?, NAT'L L.J.,
July 7, 1997, at B9.
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events and promotional merchandise. 8 This note examines the
constitutionality of the tobacco settlement as it relates to the
bans on product placement in movies. Since the historic
tobacco settlement proposal, both the federal government and
numerous state governments have renewed the effort to
regulate the portrayal of smoking on the silver screen.
The First Amendment provides a substantial bulwark in
favor of free speech against any intrusion by the federal
government.9  Subsequently, the Fourteenth Amendment
applied this protection against state intrusion. 10 However, the
right to free speech is not absolute and can be abridged under
certain circumstances.' 1 Historically, cigarette placement in
motion pictures has escaped governmental regulation.
However, this was not due to a lack of federal regulation.
Federal regulation of tobacco-related products began in
earnest with the Surgeon General's report on the health
hazards associated with smoking.' 2 This report prompted
congressional regulation of tobacco products. The first such
regulation was the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act of 1965, which precipitated the infamous warning
displayed so prominently on all tobacco products and
advertisements. 13 Then, in 1970, Congress passed the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 4 which prohibited tobacco
producers from advertising and promoting their products on
television and radio. This Act demonstrates that there is
precedent for an absolute ban of tobacco products in an
entertainment medium.
This Note examines those circumstances which lend
themselves to governmental regulation, or even proscription,
8. Id. This Note was written and edited while the federal tobacco settlement
was still pending. The issues discussed are still relevant to any present or future
legislative restrictions on tobacco product placement in movies.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING & HEALTH: REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, 28-29 (1964).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994). All cigarette advertisements and
products must contain the following warning: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May
Be Hazardous to Your Health."
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
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of speech. In connection with this analysis, this Note focuses
upon pre-existing regulation of tobacco advertising, as well as
proposed regulation of tobacco advertising. More specifically,
this Note addresses how tobacco advertisement restrictions
will affect product placement in movies. Part I of this Note
traces the history of the commercial speech doctrine, starting
with the seminal case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,i5 right up
to the most recent case of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island.16 Part II provides a definitional overview of what
constitutes product placement, as well as the tobacco
industry's use of product placement in movies. Part III
analyzes the Executive Branch's pre-existing regulations of
tobacco products, as well as proposed regulations. This Part
also looks more specifically at the effect which the Executive's
regulations would have on the movie industry, vis-a-vis
product placement. Part IV gives an overview of the proposed
tobacco settlement of 1997 and how it will affect the
symbiosis of the tobacco industry and the motion picture
industry. Lastly, this note, in Part V, concludes that product
placement is commercial speech and therefore should be
granted heightened protection under recent Supreme Court
case law, including the 44 Liquormart case.
I
Background
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
1. The Motive Test
The first bifurcation of speech occurred in the Valentine v.
Chrestensen17 case, which recognized the separate categories
of commercial and noncommercial speech. In Chrestensen, the
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited the
dissemination of advertising leaflets. 18 The respondent
protested against the ordinance as an unjustified and
unlawful intrusion into his liberty, as guaranteed under the
15. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
16. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
17. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
18. Id. at 54.
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Fourteenth and First Amendments of the United States
Constitution. 19 In the context of the First Amendment, the
Court's dichotomy between the two types of speech created a
situation where "purely commercial" 20 speech would not be
protected from governmental infringement. Unfortunately, the
Court did not define or expound on the phrase "purely
commercial speech." In addition, the Court did not provide
any guidelines to help lower courts discern between
commercial and noncommercial speech, or speech which
contained aspects of both.2 1 The Court did, however, imply
that the primary component of commercial speech centers
around the speaker's motive.22 The Court concluded that if
"the respondent was attempting to use the streets of New York
by distributing commercial advertising, the prohibition . . .
was lawful[]. 23
2. The Content Test
The implication that commercial speech hinges upon the
speaker's motive was officially discarded when the Court
decided the case of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations.24 There, the plaintiff
newspaper company violated an ordinance by utilizing an
employment advertising system which classified its potential
employees based upon gender.25 The Court focused on the
plaintiffs want-ads, holding them to be purely commercial
and therefore unprotected under the Chrestensen case. 2 6 The
emphasis of the Court's analysis changed from the speaker's
motive to the content of that speech. In holding that the
plaintiffs want-ads supported illegal discrimination on the
basis of gender, the Court provided the definition of
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Scott Joachim, Note, Seeing Beyond the Smoke and Mirrors: A
Proposal for the Abandonment of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and an Analysis
of Recent Tobacco Advertising Regulations, 19 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 517, 522
(1997).
22. Id.
23. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 55.
24. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
25. Id. at 379.
26. See id. at 385, 391.
[VOL. 21:205
commercial speech: "[speech which does] no more than
propose a commercial transaction."
27
The following term, the Court further denounced
Chrestensen's motive test in the case of Bigelow v. Virginia.2 8
In Bigelow, the plaintiff, an underground newspaper at a
Virginia university, was convicted for violating a Virginia
statute which proscribed advertising that aided or encouraged
abortions. 29 The statute rested upon the idea that since all
advertising must be paid for, it was therefore commercial.3 °
Upon payment, the advertisement was infused with
commercial properties and was thus subject to proscription by
the Virginia legislature. The Supreme Court, recognizing the
dual nature of the advertisement, accorded the plaintiff
constitutional protection under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 31 The Court expressly rejected its motive test
under Chrestensen and upheld a content-based balancing
test.32 This test balances the importance of the speech against
the statute's reasonableness and whether it serves a
"legitimate public interest."33 While this test adequately
identified commercial and noncommercial speech, it failed to
provide consistency and required a case-by-case analysis, the
outcome of which was dependent upon the content of the
speech, the public's interest in the free flow of information
34
and the legitimate public interest of the government.
27. Id. at 385.
28. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
29. Id. at 812.
30. Id. at 818.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 820-22.
33. Id. at 825-26.
34. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). This case involved a Virginia statute which
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of their prescription drugs.
Id. at 749-50. The Court, despite the pharmacists' purely economic motivations,
struck down the statute. Id. at 750. The Court reasoned that society's general
interest in the free flow of information regarding economics and consumerism
"may be as keen, if not keener by far, than [the] interest in the day's most urgent
political debate." Id. at 763-64. This holding, however, did not lead to the
eradication of the commercial/non-commercial distinction.
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3. The Modem Commercial Speech Test: Central Hudson's 4-Part
Test
The modern commercial speech test, aimed at resolving
the inconsistent and largely unpredictable Bigelow/Virginia
Board of Pharmacy test, is, in large part, derived from Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York.as  The Court, while maintaining the
commercial/noncommercial dichotomy, 6  limited the
definition of commercial speech to an "expression [that]
relate[s] solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."3 7 The Court devised a four-part test in order to
determine the legality of governmental intervention of
speech.a Under the Central Hudson test, the initial inquiry is
whether the speech is misleading or related to unlawful
activity. 9 If it can be shown that the speech is not misleading
or unlawful, then the speech is protectable under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The government regulation
must then satisfy the second prong of the Central Hudson
test.4 ° Under the second prong, the government must show a
substantial interest in regulating the commercial speech. 4 1
Under the third prong, the government regulation must
directly advance the substantial interest forwarded under the
second prong.4 2 After the third prong is satisfied, the fourth
prong mandates that the government show that its interest
could not be served as well by an alternate, less restrictive
form of regulation.4 3
35. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
36. Justice Blackmun, in opposition to the commercial/non-commercial
dichotomy, argued that: "No differences between commercial speech and other
protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence
public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information." Id. at
578 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Further, government advertising regulations are
"a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, ...
[protecting the State] from the visibility that direct regulation would entail." Id. at
574-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 561.
38. See id. at 566
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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The Central Hudson case involved a plaintiff electrical
utility corporation which was prohibited from promotional
advertising.44  The State Commission argued that the
monopolistic nature of utilities justified the proscription as a
way of counterbalancing the inherent power and privilege
consistent with a public utility. 45 The State Commission also
posited the theory that it had an interest in energy
conservation and that promotional advertisement would act as
a counter-measure to that interest.46 The Central Hudson
Corporation satisfied its burden of showing that the ads were
not misleading or related to unlawful activity,4 7 thereby
transferring the burden to the state to satisfy prongs two
through four. The State Commission met its burden in prongs
two and three, but failed to show that a less restrictive
regulation could not serve that interest as well. 48 By
invalidating the state proscription on advertising in Central
Hudson, the Supreme Court solidified its implicit and unclear
stance in Virginia Board of Pharmacy.49 While commercial
speech is not granted the strong protection of political speech,
the Court is willing to invalidate governmental restrictions on
commercial speech which deny or unconstitutionally limit the
"fullest possible dissemination of information" to the public. 5 0
The Supreme Court's stance of granting commercial speech
limited protection emphasizes the Court's opposition to
governmental paternalism in the area of First Amendment free
speech cases.
51
The primary problem with the Central Hudson test was
the ease with which a legislative body could satisfy the third
prong. After Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co. 2 and United States v. Edge Broadcasting,53 it appeared
44. Id. at 559.
45. See id. at 566.
46. See id. at 568.
47. See d. at 570.
48. See id.
49. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
50. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62.
51. Id.
52. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
53. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). In both Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, the Court
held that in determining whether the state regulation directly advanced the state
interests involved, great deference would be accorded to the legislature. Id. at
1998l
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that the government need only use "common sense" in order
to determine whether the regulation in question would directly
advance the government's interest.54 However, this deferential
approach was soon to be altered, resulting in a much
narrower interpretation of Central Hudson's third and fourth
prongs.
4. Strengthening the Third Prong of the Central Hudson Test
Despite the deferential approach taken in Posadas, the
Supreme Court took a strong stance against governmental
paternalism which attempted to protect the public in the gain
of advertising regulations.55 In Edenfield v. Fane,56 the Court
substantiated the Central Hudson test by providing an
evidentiary standard for determining whether a governmental
body has satisfied its burdens under the second and third
prongs of the Central Hudson test.57 This evidentiary standard
required the government body to show that its interests were
advanced in a "direct and material way" by its regulations. 58
In Edenfield, the Court invalidated the Florida Board of
Accountancy's prohibition against in-person solicitation by
certified public accountants. 59 The plaintiff CPA contested
that the proscription interfered with his First Amendment
right to free speech and unconstitutionally deprived him of the
liberty to compete within his profession.60 The Florida Board
argued that absent a regulation prohibiting in-person
solicitation, accountants would seek employment in a manner
that included fraud and overreaching. 6 1 In striking down the
Florida CPA prohibition, the Court held that the Board of
Accountancy failed to produce any statistical studies showing,
427-28.
54. Mary B. Meaden, Joe Camel and the Targeting of Minors in Tobacco
Advertising: Before and After 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 31 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1011, 1043 (1997).
55. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-75 (1983);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977).
56. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 771.
59. Id. at 770.
60. Id. at 764.
61. Id. at 764-65.
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in a direct and material way, that in-person solicitation
furthers fraud and overreaching.62 Thus, the Court once again
affirmed its holding that commercial speech is afforded some
constitutional protection under the First Amendment.63
Finally, in the case of Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,64 the
Court established a strong evidentiary standard which must
be satisfied before government legislation could be permitted.
In Rubin, the Court placed the burden of proof on the
legislature, requiring empirical evidence to be submitted
showing that the regulation would significantly alleviate the
harm that the government sought to prevent.65 The Court
invalidated a federal regulation regarding printing alcohol-
content on beer labels. 66 The Court's refusal to give deferential
treatment to the federal government's regulation hinged upon
the fact that no empirical evidence could be found to support
the government's interest.6 7 The only "evidence" which could
be mustered by the federal government was "(a)necdotal" in
nature, supported by mere "educated guesses."68
B. The Decline of the Central Hudson Test?
1. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island
With its plurality decision in the case of 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island,69 the Court left many unanswered
questions regarding the continuing validity of the
commercial/noncommercial dichotomy which has existed
since Chrestensen. In 44 Liquormart, the Court applied the
Central Hudson test, utilizing the newest evidentiary standard
promulgated in Rubin.70 Here, Rhode Island placed a ban on
retail price advertising of alcoholic beverages.71 In 1991, 44
62. Id. at 771.
63. Id.
64. 514 U.S. 478 (1995).
65. Id. at 489-90.
66. Id. at 490. The Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2)
(1994), prohibited beer labels from advertising alcohol-content in order to avoid
"strength wars" amongst brewers. Id. at 479.
67. Id. at 489-90.
68. Id.
69. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
70. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505.
71. Id. at 489.
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Liquormart, Inc. advertised a picture of rum and vodka bottles
with the word "WOW" adjacent to the bottles.7 2 The Rhode
Island Liquor Control Administrator assessed a fine, despite
the lack of any price quotation, because of the implied
reference to bargain prices for alcohol.7 3
The Court invalidated the Rhode Island statute because
the ban on retail price advertising of alcohol was more
extensive than necessary to achieve the state's goal of
promoting temperance.74 The Court's hostility toward the
Rhode Island statute was nearly unanimous. However, the
plurality resulted from the Justices' failure to agree on how to
implement the Central Hudson test. Although Justice Stevens'
plurality, Justice O'Connor's faction, and Justice Scalia all
applied the Central Hudson test in striking down Rhode
Island's ban, Justice Stevens' plurality focused on an
independent rationale.75 Borrowing from the general premise
behind Virginia Board of Pharmacy and a footnote from
Central Hudson, Stevens promoted the "special care"
doctrine.7 6 The plurality wrote that the Supreme Court should
exercise "special care" when reviewing state legislative efforts
that "'entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue
a non-speech-related policy."'77
2. The Influence of the Special Care Doctrine
Applying this analysis to the 44 Liquormart case, Rhode
Island's complete ban on the advertisement of alcohol prices
should warrant special care because Rhode Island's interest
in temperance is non-speech-related. Furthermore, the Court
should be wary of a complete "blanket ban" over the
"dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial
messages."78 This language hearkens to the Court's stance
against governmental paternalism, as well as supporting "an
72. Id. at 492.
73. Id. at 492-93.
74. See Gregory D. Bassuk, Note, Advertising Rights and Industry Fights: A
Constitutional Analysis of Tobacco Advertising Restrictions in a Federal Legislative
Settlement of Tobacco Industry Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 715, 736 (1997).
75. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 498.
76. Id. at 500.
77. Id. (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9).
78. Id. at 501.
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interpretation of the First Amendment that provides
constitutional protection for the dissemination of accurate
and nonmisleading commercial messages."7 9
Thus, while the Court has not yet decided a commercial
speech case after 44 Liquormart, Stevens' implication is that
commercial speech will be accorded strong judicial protection
whenever state bans completely proscribe advertising based
on interests which are not related to speech.8 ° It remains to be
seen whether the "special care" doctrine will be absorbed into
the Central Hudson four-part test, or whether it will initiate
the creation of an entirely new First Amendment commercial
speech test. Most commentators, however, have merely
incorporated the special care rule into the Central Hudson
test, thereby establishing a five-part test: 1) if the advertiser is
promoting an illegal or misleading product or form of conduct,
then there is no First Amendment protection; 2) if a
government statute completely proscribes the dissemination
of completely truthful and non-misleading advertising
consumer information, such as price or availability, then
there is First Amendment protection; 3) the government must
advance a substantial interest in regulating the speech; 4) the
regulation under review must directly advance that interest,
keeping in mind the evidentiary standard forwarded in Rubin;
and 5) that restriction must be narrowly tailored to achieve
the desired objective. 8 1 If the government can satisfy these five
prongs, then the regulation should prevail over the First
Amendment's guaranteed right to free speech.
79. Id. at 496.
80. Absent untruthful or misleading advertising, which the government can
readily prohibit in order to protect the consumer public at large. See, e.g.,
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
763 (1976).
81. See generally Donald W. Garner and Richard J. Whitney, Protecting
Children from Joe Camel and his Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal
Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479 (1997).
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II
Product Placement
A. Introduction
Based on the Supreme Court's current definition of, and
test for, determining commercial speech, the next step is to
apply the legal emanations of product placement to the
constitutional framework of commercial speech. The
application of the commercial speech doctrine to the practice
of product placement presents two basic questions: first,
whether product placement is commercial speech; and
second, if product placement is commercial speech, how may
it be regulated under the 44 Liquormart framework? 82
B. Product Placement is Commercial Speech
The 44 Liquormart case sets precedent for the Supreme
Court to determine the constitutionality of a governmental
regulation of commercial speech. However, the first step in
analyzing the constitutionality of a regulation on speech
requires that a court determine if the regulated speech is
commercial or noncommercial. 44 Liquormart served to
underscore, among other things, the idea that noncommercial
speech is entitled to constitutional protection.8 3 Similarly,
Central Hudson provided legal analysts with the definition of
what commercial speech entails: expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.8 4 The
following cases help to show the constitutional evolution of
commercial speech.
The seminal case of Valentine v. Chrestensen first
distinguished between commercial and noncommercial
speech.8 5  Chrestensen's original bifurcation of speech
distinguished between noncommercial speech and speech
which comprised "purely commercial advertising." 8 6 This
82. See William Benjamin Lackey, Can Lois Lane Smoke Marlboros?: An
Examination of the Constitutionality of Regulating Product Placement in Movies,
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275, 280 (1993).
83. 517 U.S. at 501.
84. 447 U.S. at 561 (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).
85. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
86. See Lackey, supra note 82, at 280.
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original definition, however, did not take account of speech
which contained both advertising and noncommercial speech,
such as political speech.
In the case of Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,8 7 the Court re-examined its
definition of commercial speech, while maintaining its test for
constitutionality articulated in Central Hudson. In Posadas,
the speech at issue proposed a commercial transaction for a
casino resort, and could therefore be restricted.88 This new
legal perspective on commercial speech suggested that the
mere mention of a product sold by a producer or an advertiser
constitutes commercial speech, because it proposes a
commercial transaction. 89
1. Commercial Speech is Entitled to Broad First Amendment
Protection
With the decision of the 44 Liquormart case, the Supreme
Court signaled the death of the Posadas standard and the
arrival of broad protection for commercial speech.90 44
Liquormart, at the very least, relaxed the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech.9 1 At the most, 44
Liquormart eliminated the distinction, thereby granting the
same First Amendment protection to commercial speech that
had existed for noncommercial speech. 92 44 Liquormart may
stand for the proposition that historical distinctions between
commercial and noncommercial speech are without merit and
that commercial speech should be given equal protection. This
elevation of commercial speech is expressed in Justice
Thomas' concurring opinion,' where he stated that: "[A]II
attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them
87. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
88. Id. at 340.
89. See Lackey, supra note 82, at 282.
90. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489.
91. See Arlen W. Langvardt and Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and
the Birth of Change in Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart,
34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483, 552 (Summer, 1997).
92. See id. Justice Thomas, advocating the elimination of the distinction
between commercial and non-commercial speech, said, "I do not see a
philosophical or historical basis for asserting 'commercial' speech is of 'lower
value' than 'non-commercial' speech." 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 522 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19981
ignorant are impermissible. " 9 3 This anti-paternalistic view,
and the Court's view in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, when it
said that the "consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information... may be as keen, if not keener, by
far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate,"94 both support this proposition. Therefore, under the
44 Liquormart framework, commercial speech is accorded the
same level of First Amendment protection as noncommercial
speech. 95 In this way, 44 Liquormart and Central Hudson
create the framework under which product placement must be
analyzed.
2. Product Placement
Product placement, in this context, involves a conscious
effort by a producer/advertiser to influence consumers to buy
their goods by placing those goods in situations which result
in high exposure. An essential element of product placement
is that exhibitions are driven by purely economic motivations.
The classic example, which best demonstrates the idea of
product placement, was the use of Reese's Pieces candies in
the movie E.T.: THE EXTRA TERRESTRIAL. 9 6 The use of Reese's
Pieces in such a globally popular movie led to tremendous
exposure of the candy. The success which Reese's Pieces
enjoyed has paved the way for increased product placement in
the movies. For example, the continued success of the James
Bond saga reflects the public's fascination not only with
007's exploits, but also with catching a sneak-peek at his
new BMW. 97 As a result, nearly every big-budget Hollywood
blockbuster utilizes product placement to help finance its
soaring costs. 98
93. Id. at 526 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
94. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
95. Additionally, the Court has recognized that dual aspect speech,
containing both commercial and non-commercial speech, deserves broad First
Amendment protection. See Joachim, supra note 21, at 542.
96. E.T., THE EXTRA TERRESTRIAL (Universal Pictures 1982).
97. GOLDENEYE and ToMORROW NEVER DIES both introduced new BMW cars
which helped propel Bond through numerous situations, as well as to propel
those car's popularity forward. GOLDENEYE (MGM/UA 1995). TOMORROW NEVER
DIES (MGM/UA 1997).
98. See Mark Crispin Miller, Hollywood: The Ad, 265 THE ATLANTrrIC 41 (Apr.
1990).
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3. Tobacco Products and Movies
Almost since the beginning of its national recognition, the
motion picture industry and cigarettes have gone hand in
hand. In fact, "Hollywood loves a good cigarette."99 In the
golden years of film-making, Hollywood and cigarette makers
were unabashed bedfellows due to the moral and
governmental regulations which prohibited explicit sexual
situations between actors. When Lauren Bacall blew a plume
of smoke at Humphrey Bogart in To HAVE AND HAVE NOT,
Hollywood was able to convey the burgeoning sexual dynamic
between the two stars, at a time when films were heavily
censored.10 0 This film, and others like it, created the oft-cited
generalization that "smoking was eroticized."' 0 ' Starting in
1971, when the federal government banned cigarette ads from
the airwaves (including radio and television),' 0 2 the motion
picture and tobacco industries have stepped up their
bombardment of films with product placements. 1
0 3
Motion pictures are no longer subject to censorship, only
ratings regulations. Therefore, the need for cigarettes as a
substitute for sex has been greatly reduced. Nonetheless,
cigarette manufacturers continue to promote their product.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., for example, agreed to
pay half a million dollars to actor Sylvester Stallone, in
exchange for promotion of its cigarettes. 10 4 What followed was
John Rambo, in Stallone's epic RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD,
10 5
sharing the screen with Kool, Raleigh, and Barclay.
10 6
Similarly, Phillip Morris, the producer of Marlboros, placed its
product between the lips of Margot Kidder in SUPERMAN and
99. Smoking Becoming Part of Hollywood Nostalgia, CHIC. TRIB., June 22,
1997, at B8, available in 1997 WL 3561134.
100. See id.; To HAVE AND HAVE NOT (MGM 1944).
101. See Smoking Becoming Part of Hollywood Nostalgia, supra note 99
(quoting William Moritz, professor of film at the California Institute of the Arts).
Id.
102. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
103. It is estimated that marketers paid between $10 and $50 million for
product placement in the year 1990. See Randall Rothenberg, Critics Seek F.T.C.
Action on Products as Movie Stars, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1991, at D5.
104. See Adam Levy, Cigarettes to Lose 'Star' Status, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June
25, 1997, at D12, available in 1997 WL 6842965.
105. RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD (Carolco Pictures 1982).
106. SeeLevy, supranote 104, atD12.
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SUPERMAN II. 107 In SUPERMAN II, Phillip Morris paid $42,000 for
Kidder's use of the cigarettes, as well as scenes depicting
Superman flying past Marlboro billboards and Marlboro
delivery trucks.'0 8 Since then, the Liggett Group paid $30,000
to have its Eve cigarettes displayed prominently in the movie
SUPERGIRL, 10 9 Phillip Morris paid $350,000 to have James
Bond tote his cigarette of choice, Lark cigarettes, in the film
LICENCE TO KILL. 1 10 In a more recent trend, cigarettes have
been reserved for crooks, killers, and psychopaths. 111 In the
post-apocalyptic picture WATERWORLD, 1 12 the bad guy, played
by Dennis Hopper, led a group of thugs called the
"smokers."' 1 3 Sharon Stone, in her breakthrough movie BASIC
INSTINCT, 1 4 where she played a sexually provocative murder
suspect, was seen lighting up numerous times. 115 John
Travolta also has proven to be a cigarette magnet. Whether he
is portraying an angel in MICHAEL, 1 16 a hit-man/thug in PULP
FICTION, 117 or a nuclear arms dealer in BROKEN ARROW, 1 18
Travolta can be seen smoking one cigarette after another. In
the recent blockbuster, MEN IN BLACK, 1 19 a little alien is seen
pushing a cart of Marlboros.
Tobacco foes attest that the most unsettling aspect of
movie stars promoting tobacco is embodied in the person of
Arnold Schwarzenegger. The former Chairman of the
President's Council on Physical Fitness & Sports, under
President Bush, 120 can be seen smoking a cigarette in his
107. See id. SUPERMAN: THE MOVIE (Warner Brothers 1978); SUPERMAN II
(Warner Brothers 1981).
108. See Thomas Ferrarro, The Hollywood-Madison Avenue Connection?, UPI,
Oct. 17, 1985 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file.
109. SUPERGIRL (Universal Pictures 1983). See Levey, supra note 104, at D12.
110. LICENSE TO KILL (United Artists 1988). In addition, 007 used Q's
seemingly everyday pack of Lark cigarettes to destroy, via explosion, a window of
Bond's nemesis in the movie. See Lackey, supra note 82, at 278.
111. SeeLevy, supra note 104, at D12.
112. WATERWORLD (MCA/Universal Pictures 1995).
113. SeeLevy, supranote 104, atD12.
114. BASIc INSTINCT (TriStar Pictures 1992).
115. SeeLevy, supranote 104, at D12.
116. MICHAEL (Turner Pictures 1996).
117. PULP FICTION (Miramax Films & A Band Apart 1994).
118. BROKEN ARROW (20th Century Fox 1996).
119. MEN IN BLACK (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1997).
120. "Arnold Schwarzenegger Classic" (visited Feb. 20, 1998)
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blockbuster film TRUE LIES. 1 2 1 In addition, Schwarzenegger
regularly flaunts his affair with cigars. Cigars, which have not
achieved the notoriety of cigarettes, are equally damaging to
the human body.12 2 Lastly, Julia Roberts' incessant nervous
smoking in MY BEST FRIEND'S WEDDING 123 has led to an uproar
in the media and in Washington D.C. 124 Therefore, whether it
is Lauren Bacall, Margot Kidder, John Travolta or Sharon
Stone, anti-tobacco proponents have few reservations about
the effect that showing stars smoking can have on
encouraging tobacco use. It is for this reason, among others,
that politicians have been leading the charge to curb the
portrayal of smoking in movies.
4. The Relation Between Movies and Advertising
In 1959, the Supreme Court held that noncommercial
speech is protected, despite being packaged in a form which is
sold for profit. 125 The case of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson
was the first case which provided the modem-day
characterization of the content of motion pictures and
films. 126 In Wilson, petitioner Burstyn analogized film, which
was previously unprotected under the case of Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,127 to other forms of
speech. 128 The Court, starting with the case of Gitlow v. New
York, 129 affirmed the notion that freedom of speech and the
press were safeguarded by the liberty clause of the Fourteenth
<http://www.schwarzenegger.com/amold.html>. Schwarzenegger is currently
the Chairman of the Governor's Council of Physical Fitness in California. See Id.
121. TRUE LIES (20th Century Fox 1994).
122. Alec Klein, The Cigar Caper, BALT. SUN, Jan. 13, 1998, at A18, available
in 1997 WL 4946278.
123. MY BEST FRIENDS WEDDING (TriStar Pictures 1997).
124. See, e.g., Glenn Lovellm, Reebok Victory Puts Film-makers in Tough
Position with Product Placement, PITT. POST-GAZElTE, Jan. 4, 1998, at G3;
Thomas Doherty, The Cigarette - It's Still Cool on Screen, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 1997,
at A37.
125. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959). The Smith case
focused on non-commercial speech which was published in a book. Despite the
book being sold for profit, the Court held that the speech which comprised the
book was protected. Id.
126. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
127. 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
128. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 499.
129. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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Amendment against state invasion. 130 Thirty-four years later,
the Court held in Wilson that Gitlow necessarily overruled the
Mutual Film case.' 3 ' In Wilson, the petitioner attempted to
screen a film entitled THE MIRACLE. 132 However, he was denied
the necessary license by the New York Education
Department. 133 The Court held that motion pictures are
protected by the right to freedom of speech and expression. 134
Three ideas are central to the Court's holding. The first is
that the protection afforded to motion pictures cannot be
diminished by the fact that they are designed to entertain, as
well as to inform. 135 The Court makes clear that certain
aspects of a film, which are not meant solely to entertain, are
protected despite their informative nature: 'The line between
the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right [a free press]. Everyone is
familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is
one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine."136
Impliedly, this statement grants judicial sanction to product
placement because it recognizes the idea that a commercial
message (e.g., cigarette smoking is cool) can exist within an
idea meant primarily to entertain (e.g., a motion picture). 137
Secondly, the Court responds to the idea that irrespective of
the artistic nature of a film, the economic factors of a motion
picture remove it from First Amendment protection. The Court
disregarded this notion by stating that a film's operation for
profit has no effect upon the liberty that the First Amendment
safeguards.138 Finally, and most importantly for this Note, the
New York Education Department urged that movies are not
entitled to First Amendment protection because they possess
130. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
131. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 502.
132. Id. at 498.
133. See id. at 499.
134. See id. at 502.
135. See id. at 501.
136. Id. (quoting Winters, v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)).
137. In effect, Steven Spielberg's amusement, via E.T., teaches movie-goers
about the intergalactic appeal of Reese's Pieces. In a similar vein, the movies
which America so desperately needs for amusement are saturated with product
placement. The doctrine of cigarettes (for example, smoking a cigarette makes
you cool or grown-up) can be taught through movie promotion.
138. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501-02.
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a "greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a
community." 139 The Court responded by stating that: "Even if
one were to accept this hypothesis, it does not follow that
motion pictures should be disqualified from First Amendment
protection."140 This is the exact argument that tobacco foes
are currently forwarding with regard to the portrayal of
tobacco products in movies.14 ' Just as this argument was not
accepted by the Supreme Court in 1952, it should not be
accepted today.
One response to Wilson is that it did not foreclose the idea
that, although movies are granted First Amendment
protection, free expression is not absolute: "If there be
capacity for evil it may be relevant in determining the
permissible scope of community control."' 42 Wilson opened
the door to the regulation of movies and books found in the
case of Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.143 In that
case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional power of
states and cities to prevent the exposure of children to books
and films, while underscoring their inability to regulate adult
exposure.144 However, no formal government regulations have
been accepted which would curtail the freedom of speech
which motion pictures now enjoy. 145 Working in conjunction
with movie theater associations and distribution associations,
the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA")
established voluntary film ratings systems, with the objective
of giving advance warning to parents so that parents could
make the decision about the movie their child wishes to
see.146 These ratings are enforced through the movie theaters,
distributors, and the MPAA. 147
139. Id. at 502.
140. Id.
141. See Big Tobacco's Racial Stereotypes, Strategies for Luring Children, S. F.
CHRON., Feb. 6, 1998, at A5. Furthermore, President Clinton called for "changes
in the way the tobacco industry does business," including cutting marketing to
children and creating programs to discourage children from smoking. See How
Clinton Could Win on Tobacco: Wide Opposition to Teen Smoking, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 18, 1997, at Al.
142. 343 U.S. at 502.
143. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
144. Id. at 683.
145. See Jack Valenti, "Movie Ratings: How it Works" (visited Dec. 11, 1998)
<http//www.mpaa.org/movieratings/about/index/htm>.
146. Valenti states that: 'The entire rostrum of the rating program rests on
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One commentator has even theorized that the struggle
between the federal government and the tobacco industry,
marshaling widespread political and social debate, has
molded tobacco advertising into a "major political issue,"
thereby transforming it into political speech. 148 Under this
view, the merits of tobacco advertising would be afforded full
constitutional protection, surpassing the level guaranteed to
the film itself. 149
III
Executive Action
A. The Executive's Regulation of Tobacco Advertising
In light of the proposed settlement and on-going state
litigation efforts, the tobacco companies' ability to promote
and advertise their wares has been drastically curtailed. As
mentioned before, federal regulation of tobacco products has
included the Surgeon General's report, 150  the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965,151 and the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act. 152
These restrictions, according to many social
commentators, are simply not working. 153 Adolescent smoking
increased from 17% to 19% between 1992 and 1993, and
studies indicate that the average smoker begins at the age of
the assumption of responsibility by parents.... Ratings are meant for parents,
no one else." Id. Additionally, the current ratings system does not recognize
tobacco use as an event which triggers a higher rating. See id. If a rifm contains
drug use, then it automatically gets a PG-13 rating. See id. However, this does
not include use of tobacco products. See Id.
147. Id.
148. Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
1147, 1151 (Summer 1996).
149. Historically, political speech was the primary basis for the Constitutional
right to free speech under the First Amendment.
150. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING & HEALTH: REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, 28-29 (1964).
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994). All cigarette advertisements and
products must contain the following warning: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May
Be Hazardous to Your Health."
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
153. See, e.g., Allison J. Hornsby, Clinton's Smoking Regulations: Fired Up or
Nipped in the Bud?, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 243, 244 (1997).
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thirteen and is a regular smoker by the age of fourteen. 154 As
a result, President Clinton has pushed for administrative and
Congressional reform of the tobacco industry's advertising
and promotion.
B. The Food & Drug Administration and President Clinton's
Proposal
President Clinton has not masked his desire to strictly
regulate the tobacco industry. In August of 1995, President
Clinton took steps to regulate tobacco advertising through the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in order to prevent
"aggressive marketing to our young people." 155 In 1996, the
FDA declared nicotine a drug and imposed strict limits on the
advertising of tobacco products. 156 The FDA's limits comprised
the following seven restrictions: 1) institution of a federal
minimum age of eighteen years to purchase tobacco products;
2) prohibition of free samples of tobacco products; 3)
prohibition of mail-order sales, including redemption of
coupons; 4) restricting the use of cigarette vending machines
to places where no person younger than eighteen is permitted
to enter; 5) limiting advertising and labeling to black text on
white background; 6) a ban on sale or distribution of
corporate-branded items such as hats or T-shirts; and 7)
restriction of sponsorship of events to corporate names
only. 157 President Clinton offered his full support for these
restrictions by stating:
[When Joe Camel tells young children that smoking is cool,
when billboards tell teens that cigarettes will lead to true
romance, when Virginia Slims tell adolescents that cigarettes
may make them thin and glamorous, then our children need
our wisdom, our guidance and our experience. We're their
parents, and it is up to us to protect them. 158
However, on April 25, 1997, a North Carolina federal
judge ruled that the FDA did not have the power or authority
to regulate the advertising or promotional practices of the
154. See id.
155. See Joachim, supra note 21, at 539.
156. See id. at 539-40.
157. See Hornsby, supra note 153, at 243.
158. Id. at 244 (quoting President Clinton, Statement Made at a Press
Conference (Aug. 10, 1995)).
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tobacco industry.159 In response, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against RJR Nabisco
Holdings Corporation in order to enjoin further use of Joe
Camel in advertising. 160 However, the complaint was mooted
by the proposed tobacco settlement of 1997.161
IV
The Proposed Tobacco Settlement of 1997
A. Introduction
The tobacco settlement proposes sweeping changes and
restrictions on the promotional and advertising practices of
the tobacco industry. The proposed settlement would:
* Ban all outdoor tobacco product advertising;
* Ban the use of human images and cartoon characters
in all tobacco advertising and product packaging;
* Restrict advertising to a "tombstone" format of black
text on a white background;
* Ban all non-tobacco merchandise, including caps,
jackets, or bags bearing the name or logo of a tobacco
brand;
* Ban offers on non-tobacco items on proof of purchase
of tobacco products;
* Ban event sponsorships, including concerts and
sporting events, by tobacco brands;
* Prohibit tobacco product advertising on the Internet,
unless designed to be inaccessible in or from the
United States;
* Prohibit tobacco advertising in magazines or
publications with more than 15% youth readership or
more than 2 million youth readers;
* Prohibit the use of non-tobacco brand names as brand
names of tobacco products;
* Require cigarette and smokeless tobacco product
advertisements to carry the FDA-mandated statement
of intended use ('Nicotine Delivery Service');
159. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 958 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
160. See Wood, supra note 7.
161. See id.
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* Prohibit direct and indirect payments to "glamorize"
tobacco use in media appealing to minors, including
recorded and live performances in music; and
* Ban direct and indirect payments for tobacco product
placement in movies, television programs and video
games. 162
In addition, the tobacco industry would be required to pay
a settlement fee of $368.5 billion over a twenty-five year
period. 163 In return, the tobacco industry will gain restrictions
on the recovery of compensatory damages in private suits, as
well as the elimination of punitive damages claims based on
conduct occurring before the settlement. 164
B. Congressional Response
Although most settlements are not subject to
constitutional review, due to the fact that the proposal must
be congressionally sanctioned, restrictions sought in the
settlement must be in accordance with First Amendment
standards. 16' Any ban on both paid and unpaid product
placement of tobacco products in movies is constitutionally
significant because of its effect on how tobacco companies
may promote their goods in a realm where they have had
historical success. And, further, the ban will necessarily
eliminate a considerable source of funding for motion
pictures.
1. Senator Jack Burton's Quest to Regulate On-screen Smoking
Senator Jack Burton, a Democrat from California and
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said he will
hold a hearing to take testimony from representatives of the
film-making industry on increased smoking in movies. 166 One
of Senator Burton's proposals would be to place warning
labels on films, either in addition to the current guidance
162. David Schultz, Tobacco Settlement Review, CONG. TESTIMONY, July 30,
1997, available in 1997 WL 11235355.
163. Laurence H. Tribe, Tobacco Settlement Review, CONG. TESTIMONY, July
16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11234937.
164. Id..
165. See Wood, supra note 7.
166. See Greg Lucas, Burton Plans Hearings on Smoking in Movies, S. F.
CHRON., Sept. 18, 1997, at A13.
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labels, or in a manner similar to the labels on cigarette
packaging. 167 In response to the idea that most of the time
only the villain or psychotic smokes, Burton said, "Young
people are very impressionable, kids can identify with the
villain as much as with the hero." 168 Supported by both Vice-
President Al Gore and First Lady Hillary Clinton, Burton has
grounded his views on two studies involving the relationship
between movies and smoking. 16 9 First, a study by the
University of California found that half of the highest grossing
films released between 1990 and 1995 had scenes in which a
lead character smoked, a rise of twenty-nine percent from the
1970's. 170 In addition, the top ten highest grossing films in
1996 all contained smoking. 171 Second, a study by the
American Lung Association found that seventy-seven percent
of one hundred thirty-three movies released in 1996 had at
least one character who smoked. 172 Further, eleven percent of
the movies released had more than fifty separate incidents of
smoking. 173
2. Hollywood's Response
In response, Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture
Association of America, stated that "[glovernment can't lay a
hand on a director and say 'do this' or 'don't do that."'174
Valenti's remarks have constitutional merit. In the case of
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., the Court held that
"[tihe central concern of the First Amendment in this area is
that there be a free flow from creator to audience of whatever
message a film or book may convey." 175 Additionally, in the
case of Superior Films v. Department of Education, Justice
Douglass said, "[iun this Nation, every writer, actor, or
producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use,
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. The Forces Weekly Tobacco News, Moses in the Desert (visited Dec. 11,
1998) <http://forces.com/pages/news0997.htm>.
175. 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976).
230 [VOL. 21:205
should be freed from the censor."176 It remains to be seen
whether the United States Congress will attempt to pass
legislation curbing the portrayal of smoking in movies.
However, the proposed tobacco settlement is attempting to
laterally attack this portrayal of smoking in movies by
prohibiting payments for placement of tobacco products in
movies.' 7 7
V
Government Regulation of Smoking in Films is
Unconstitutional
A. Introduction
The federal government's attempted regulation of the
portrayal of smoking in movies is unconstitutional.
Congressional approval of the proposed tobacco settlement
necessarily requires that the proposal be able to withstand
First Amendment scrutiny.178 It cannot. The applicable test
for intrusions into rights of free speech is the hybrid Central
Hudson and 44 Liquormart test. As stated earlier, 179 there are
two questions which need to be resolved in order to determine
the constitutionality of the regulation: first, whether product
placement is commercial speech, and second, if product
placement is commercial speech, how may it be regulated? 180
This Note answered the first question in Part II(B)(1), where I
concluded that product placement is entitled to broad First
Amendment protection under the 44 Liquormart test. 18 1 The
second question requires the 44 Liquormart analysis to
determine the constitutional extent of permissible
governmental restrictions on speech.
176. 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglass, J., concurring).
177. See Schultz, supra note 162.
178. See Wood, supra note 7.
179. See supra Part II(A) and accompanying text.
180. See Lackey, supra note 82.
181. 44 Liquormart signaled the demise of the legal distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech, thereby establishing general protection
for all speech, including product placement. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
509-10; Langvardt and Richards, supra note 91, at 484.
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B. 44 Liquormart Analysis
The restrictions embodied in the proposed tobacco
settlement are extremely problematic under the First
Amendment analysis provided in 44 Liquormart. Briefly, a
restriction on commercial speech is unconstitutional, unless
the government can show that the restriction "directly
advances" a "substantial interest" and is "no more extensive
than necessary." 182 Under this framework, the provisions
relating to the restriction of product placement in movies are
unconstitutional.
1. The First Prong
The first step of the 44 Liquormart test warns against the
unconstitutional promotion of illegal or misleading products
or forms of conduct. 183 Tobacco use is currently legal in the
United States. The counter-argument to this point is that,
while legal, tobacco advertisements are misleading because
they depict smokers enjoying a healthy lifestyle. 184 Even
President Clinton has chimed in about the "misleading"
advertisements which the tobacco industry employs, stating
that the ads routinely "show rugged men and glamorous
women lighting up and blissful couples sharing their
cigarettes." 185 However, the basic premise of advertising is to
promote the joys of'a product, as well as the user's
contentment with that product. Accordingly, advertising
which is merely suggestive cannot be declared
unconstitutional. 186 Additionally, the adverse health effects of
continued tobacco use are mandatorily disclosed by law,
thereby "precluding any deceptive or misleading component of
tobacco advertising." 187
182. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504.
183. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
184. See Joachim, supra note 21, at 551 (citing Wendy Fox, The President's
Plan to Prevent Teen-Age Smoking is Controversial, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 4, 1995,
at 13).
185. See id. (citing Wendy Fox, The President's Plan to Prevent Teen-Age
Smoking is Controversial, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 4, 1995, at 13).
186. See id. (citing Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 627-28 (1990)).
187. See id.
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2. The Second Prong
The second prong of the 44 Liquormart test militates
against a government statute that completely proscribes the
dissemination of completely truthful and non-misleading
consumer advertising information. 188 Justice Stevens warned
against "blanket bans" over the dissemination of otherwise
truthful advertising. 189 Additionally, in the case of Reno v.
ACLU, the Court held that Internet access to certain web-sites
cannot be completely banned in order to protect children from
prurient materials. 190 The legislation must take into account
the differing interests which exist between children and
adults. 19 1 In a similar fashion, the tobacco settlement, as it
applies to films, places a blanket ban over the dissemination
of otherwise legal tobacco advertising. The ban does not
differentiate between, for example, G-rated movies and R-
rated movies. This blanket ban, therefore, makes the proposal
unconstitutional under 44 Liquormart. 19
2
3. The Third Prong
Under the third prong, the government must show a
substantial interest in regulating the commercial speech. 193
The government's primary interest lies in protecting children
and teens from the harmful bombardment of tobacco
placement in movies. This interest is evident in President
Clinton's protestations against tobacco use in the movies. 1
94
In discussing the tobacco proposal, David Kessler, former
commissioner of the Food & Drug Administration and
Clinton's long-time friend, stated that, "[w]hat the President
has cared about from the beginning is reducing the number of
kids who smoke." 195 Furthermore, the First Lady, befitting her
traditional role as the United States' chief social worker and
188. 44Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500.
189. Id.
190. 521 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346-47 (1997).
191. See id.
192. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500-01.
193. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
194. See Homsby, supra note 153 (citing President Clinton, Statement Made
at a Press Conference (Aug. 10, 1995)).
195. See Clinton to Reject Tobacco Settlement: His Top Priority is Teen Smoking,
S. F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1997, at A3.
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benefactor of children, has arduously campaigned against
tobacco use among children and teens.' 96
4. The Fourth Prong
Under the fourth prong of 44 Liquormart, the government
must show that its interests will be advanced in a "direct and
material way."19 7 If the government claims that its primary
interest is to reduce smoking among children and teens, then
a blanket ban upon paid or unpaid tobacco placement on the
silver screen is unconstitutional because the proscription is a
lateral attack upon that goal. The Court held this type of
lateral attack unconstitutional in 44 Liquormart,198 and it
should likewise be held unconstitutional here. The Court
stated that: "the First Amendment directs that government
may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress
conduct, and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as
simply another means that the government may use to
achieve its ends."199 In addition, empirical evidence must be
proffered which shows the harm would be significantly
alleviated. 20 0 Numerous studies have been conducted which
fail to show a direct connection between the advertisement of
tobacco products and future use.20 1 The only empirical
evidence which has been positively adduced is that tobacco
advertisements encourage the changing of cigarette brands by
already established smokers. 202 Without positive, scientific
proof, the Court would most likely be unwilling to engage in
196. See Klein, supra note 4.
197. See Edenfleld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 762 (1993).
198. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 511-12.
199. Id. at 512. Justice Stevens went to great lengths to denigrate lateral
attacks upon freedom of speech in order to suppress an otherwise legal form of
conduct or behavior: "As a venerable proverb teaches, it may prove more
injurious to prevent people from teaching others how to fish, than to prevent fish
from being sold." Id. at 511.
200. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 479, 489 (1995).
201. See Wood, supra note 7 (stating that: 'The problem is that no study has
been conducted that proves advertising motivates any child to take up smoking.
Studies that have been performed show that peer pressure and sibling and
parental examples are the primary reasons a child begins to smoke."). Id.
202. See Wood, supra note 7. But see, Study Finds Ads Draw Teens Into
Smoking, S. F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1998, at A4 (reporting a recent study performed
by the University of California at San Diego which, for the first time, reaches an
opposite conclusion. The study found that tobacco ads and promotions, not peer
pressure and family use, lure a significant proportion of teens into smoking. Id.
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"speculation or conjecture" regarding the harmful effects of
tobacco advertising.2 °3
5. The Fifth Prong
Under the fifth prong of the 44 Liquormart test, a
restriction on speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective.20 4 Encompassed within this prong is the
need to show that there is no viable alternative which would
have a substantially similar effect, without the same
burden.2 °5
The restriction on tobacco use in films is not narrowly
tailored. First, the Court has stated complete bans "fail[] to
leave open 'satisfactory' alternative channels of
communication."20 6 Therefore, by applying a complete ban on
tobacco placement, the government has necessarily
abandoned the possibility of alternative channels of
communication. In the context of liquor regulation, the
Supreme Court has held that a complete ban on the
advertising of liquor prices, with a goal of decreasing alcohol
consumption, is unconstitutional because other alternatives
to satisfying that goal exist. 20 7 Specifically, the Court offered
alternate solutions, such as: 1) educational programs, and 2)
moderate drinking.20 8 It is highly probable that the Court
would reach the same conclusion when the governmental goal
is to reduce smoking, and suggest the use of educational
programs, higher taxes on tobacco products, and tougher,
more ubiquitous warnings.
Additionally, the proscription on paid or unpaid tobacco
placement would place a large burden on an administrative
body to consistently audit the payment of money to film
producers. The restriction against specific brand-name use
will conflict with an actor's use of a cigarette to illuminate her
nature and character. Richard Masur, president of the Screen
Actors Guild, said that "cigarettes are the single most
expressive tool an actor may employ to convey emotions
203. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.
204. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
205. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.
206. Id. at 50 1.
207. See id. at 509.
208. Id.
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ranging from anxiety to pleasure to sensuality. 2 9 If tobacco
placement were completely banned, it could be argued that
any tobacco use in movies, even if used merely to develop a
character, is banned, which would lead to a "chilling effect"
upon the producer, director, and/or actor, as well as the
audience. This "chilling effect" could lead to serious
limitations upon freedom of expression, the likes of which
Hollywood has not endured since the 1950's.210 This effect
would lead to the exact result which Justice Douglass warned
against in the case of Superior Films v. Department of
Education.2 1'
Finally, as discussed earlier, if the real goal is to decrease
smoking in movies, to protect our children and teens, then
this is not a direct regulation to achieve that goal. Rather, the
settlement attempts to reach this goal laterally, by attacking
the constitutionally protected freedom of speech. According to
44 Liquormart, this is unconstitutional.2 12
VII
Conclusion
The Federal Government's attempts at regulating tobacco
placement in movies are unconstitutional. The complete,
blanket ban over tobacco placement in movies is
unconstitutional because it is too broad and would proscribe
traditionally protected creative expression, whether the movie
209. Sabin Russell, Studios Asked to Light Up Less, S. F. CHRON., Oct. 28,
1997, at A3.
210. The McCarthy era was, in no small degree, characterized by Ronald
Reagan and Jack Warner's utter cowardice in the face of the McCarthy hearings.
For further information on this era, see OTTO FRIEDRICH, CITY OF NETS: A
PORTRAIT OF HOLLYWOOD IN THE 1940's 291-338 (1986).
211. See supra Part IV.B.2. and accompanying text.
212. Additionally, the Court held in the case of Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997), that speech to adults may not be reduced to that appropriate for
children: "[ilt is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental
interest in protecting children from harmful materials. But that interest does not
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults . ..
The Government may not reduc[e] the adult population ... to ... only what is fit
for children." Id. at 2346-47. See also Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957) (complete ban on sale to adults of books deemed harmful to children
unconstitutional); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)
(ban on mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives
unconstitutional); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128
(1989) (ban on "dial-a-porn" messages unconstitutional).
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was intended for child audiences or adult audiences. The
government's primary interest is in protecting children and
teens, but the settlement, instead, proposes a complete ban.
Tobacco placement on the silver screen should not be subject
to a climate of repression similar to the repression which
existed during the McCarthy era. Paternalism and
suppression are not constitutional vehicles for the government
to employ in order to restrict the free flow of information. The
First Amendment vitiates against this type of repression. Until
tobacco placement in movies evolves into a situation which
can be properly termed an emergency, no prohibitions should
be allowed. "Only an emergency can justify repression." 2 13
213. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 498.
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